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I. INTRODUCTION
A detainer is a notice "filed with the institution in which a
prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face
pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction."' The other juris-
diction requests that it be notified when the prisoner's release draws
near so that it can obtain custody of him.2 A simple, informal proce-
dure,3 the practice of lodging detainers frequently frustrates the
purposes of the corrections process and denies the prisoner's right
1. S. REP. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4864, 4865. The legislative history of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is
contained in this report.
2. Wexler & Hershey, Criminal Detainers in a Nutshell, 7 Cimi. L. BULL. 753, 753 n.2
(1971).
3. See Dauber, Reforming the Detainer System: A Case Study, 7 CmM. L. BULL. 669,
670-71 (1971).
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to a speedy trial.4 The detainer thus has been the object of both
constitutional restraint and legislative reform.
In 1970, Congress enacted into law the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers Act,5 making the United States and the District of Col-
umbia parties to the interstate compact already adopted by 37
states.' The purpose of the Agreement is to "encourage the expedi-
tious and orderly disposition"7 of charges underlying detainers by
providing procedures by which prisoners may request disposition of
such charges and prosecuting jurisdictions may obtain the presence
of prisoners for trial. Recently problems of interpretation have sur-
faced as the federal courts have endeavored to define the role of the
United States under the Agreement. The courts of appeals presently
4. See Shelton, Unconstitutional Uncertainty: A Study of the Use of Detainers, 1
PROSPECTUS 119 (1968).
5. Act of Dec. 9, 1970, Pub. L. 91-538, §§ 1-8, 84 Stat. 1397 (codified at 18U.S.C. app.,
at 1395 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as IAD]. The Agreement was drafted by the Council of
State Governments.
6. D. WEXLER, THE LAW OF DETA*as 19 (LEAA Monograph 1973) [hereinafter cited
as MONOGRAPH]. As of this writing, 46 states plus the United States and the District of
Columbia have enacted the IAD. The state versions of the Agreement appear as follows:
Arizona-Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-481 to -482 (1976); Arkansas-ARu. STAT. ANN. § 43-
3201 to -3208 (1977); California-CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1389-1389.8 (West 1970); Colo-
rado-CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-60-501 to -507 (1973); Connecticut-CONN. GEN. STAT. §§
54-186 to -192 (1977); Delaware-DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2540-2550 (1974); District of
Columbia-D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-701 to -705 (1973); Florida-FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 941.45 -
.50 (West Supp. 1978); Georgia-GA. CODE ANN. §§ 77-501b to -516b (1973); Hawaii-HAW.
REv. STAT. §§ 834-1 to -6 (1976); Idaho-IDAuo CODE §§ 19-5001 to -5008 (Cum. Supp. 1977);
Illinois- ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-8-9 (Smith-Hurd 1973); Indiana-IND. CODE ANN. §§
11-1-7-1 to -7, 35-2.1-2-4 (Bums 1973); Iowa-IowA CODE ANN. §§ 759A.1 -.8 (West Supp.
1977-1978); Kansas-KAN. STAT. §§ 22-4401 to -4408 (1974); Kentucky-Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 440.450-.510 (Baldwin 1975); Maine-ME. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1411-1419 (1964); Mary-
land-MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 616A-616R (1976); Massachusetts-MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 276 app., §§ 1-1 to -8 (West 1972); Michigan-MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 780.601-.608
(1968); Minnesota-MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.294 (West Supp. 1978); Missouri-Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 222.160-.220 (Vernon Supp. 1978); Montana-MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 95-3131
to -3136 (Supp. 1977); Nebraska-NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-759 to 765 (1975); Nevada-NEv.
REV. STAT. 178.620-.640 (1973); New Hampshire-N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 606-A:1 to -6
(1974); New Jersey-N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 159A-1 to -15 (West 1971); New Mexico-N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 41-20-19 to -23 (1953); New York-N.Y. CraIM. PROC. LAW § 580-20 (McKinney
1971); North Carolina-N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-761 to -767 (1975); North Dakota-N.D.
CENT. CODE 29-34-01 to -08 (1974); Ohio-Oaio REv. CODE ANN. § 2963.30-.35 (Page 1975);
Oregon-OR. REv. STAT. §§ 135.775-.793 (1977); Pennsylvania-PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§
1431-1438 (Purdon 1964); Rhode Island-R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 13-13-1 to -8 (1977); South Caro-
lina-S.C. CODE §§ 17-11-10 to -80 (1976); South Dakota-S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 23-
24A-1 to -34 (1977); Tennessee-TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-3901 to -3908 (1975); Texas-TEX.
CraIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 51.14 (Vernon Supp. 1966-1977); Utah-UTAH CODE ANN. 99 77-
65-4 to -11 (Supp. 1977); Vermont-VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 1501-1509, 1531-1537 (1970);
Virginia-VA. CODE §§ 53-304.1 -. 8 (1974); Washington-WAsH. REv. CODEANN. §§ 9.100.010-
.080 (1977); West Virginia-W. VA. CODE §§ 62-14-1 to -7 (1977); Wisconsin-Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 976.05-.06 (West 1977); Wyoming-Wyo. STAT. §§ 7-408.9 -. 15 (1975).
7. IAD, art. I.
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disagree on the issue whether the Agreement applies to transfers of
prisoners pursuant to the federal writ of habeas corpus ad prose-
quendum. One view applies the Agreement broadly as the exclusive
means of transfer among member states.' Other courts, holding that
the federal writ, unlike a detainer, does not adversely affect the
prisoner's rehabilitation, have refused to require compliance with
the Agreement when the federal writ is used The issue currently
is before the Supreme Court.'0 After examining the background of
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and its interpretation by
state courts, this Note will evaluate the various federal interpreta-
tions and propose a solution that is harmonious with present con-
gressional intent and that accommodates the needs of both prison-
ers and prosecutors.
1I. BACKGROUND OF THE INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS
A. History of Detainers
The detainer has long been criticized in the literature of penol-
ogy and corrections for its corrosive effect on rehabilitation, its
needless curtailment of prison privileges, and its obstruction of the
prisoner's right to obtain a speedy trial on the underlying charges."
Often merely a letter written by a prosecutor, police officer, or pa-
role authority,'2 a detainer may be viewed casually by the issuing
authority, who might not intend to act on the charge, but merely
seeks "insurance" that the prisoner can be picked up upon his re-
8. See Part IV(B)(3) infra.
9. See Part IV(B)(2) infra.
10. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 816
(1977), oral argument heard March 8, 1978; United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 434 U.S. 816 (1977), oral argument heard March 8, 1978.
11. See, e.g., Bates, The Detained Prisoner and His Adjustment, 9 FED. PROBATION 16
(July-Sept. 1945); Bennett, The Correctional Administrator Views Detainers, 9 FED.
PROBATION 8 (July-Sept. 1945); Bennett, "The Last Full Ounce," 23 FED. PROBATION 20 (June
1959); Heyns, The Detainer in a State Correctional System, 9 FED. PROBATION 13 (July-Sept.
1945); Hincks, The Need for Comity in Criminal Administration, 9 FED. PROBATION 3 (July-
Sept. 1945); Perry, Effect of Detainers on Sentencing Policies, 9 FED. PROBATION 11 (July-
Sept. 1945); Schindler, Interjurisdictional Conflict and the Right to a Speedy Trial, 35 U.
CIN. L. REV. 179 (1966); Note, The Detainer: A Problem in Interstate Criminal
Administration, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1190 (1948); Note, Convicts-The Right to a Speedy Trial
and the New Detainer Statutes, 18 RuTGERs L. REv. 828 (1964); Note, Detainers and the
Correctional Process, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 417; Note, Effective Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for
Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, 77 YALE L.J. 767 (1968).
12. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sanders v. Arnold, 535 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1976); Crow
v. United States, 323 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1963) (detainer based on complaint, not indictment);
People v. Bryarly, 23 I1. 2d 313, 178 N.E.2d 326 (1961) (detainer lodged despite prosecutor's
intention not to prosecute); State ex rel. Faehr v. Scholer, 106 Ohio App. 399, 155 N.E.2d
230 (1958) (detainer lodged by police).
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lease from prison.13 Most state detainers on federal prisoners are
withdrawn prior to completion of the prisoner's original sentence, 4
and less than half of all detainers are acted upon or even filed with
the intention of following up on them.'5
However routinely the detainer is viewed by the issuing official,
prison authorities regard it seriously and henceforth treat the pris-
oner differently. A prisoner known to be wanted by another jurisdic-
tion is considered a greater escape risk and thus may be deprived
of prison privileges"6 or placed in maximum custody automatically
without consideration of the seriousness of the charge, his attitude,
or the likelihood that the detainer will be acted upon.'7 Many parole
authorities will not "parole to a detainer," considering release of a
prisoner useless since he immediately Will be deprived of liberty by
another charge.' 8 The drafters of the Interstate Agreement on Detai-
ners noted that detainers defeat the objectives of the correctional-
rehabilitative system by creating anxiety, apprehension, and bitter-
ness in prisoners.' 9
Despite the severe criticism in legal literature, courts consis-
tently have rejected constitutional challenges to the detainer itself
and to the restrictions placed on prisoners against whom detainers
have been lodged. Separation of powers and deference to the experi-
ence and expertise of corrections officials are typical grounds for
upholding the restrictions on a "detained" prisoner." As long as the
13. Dauber, supra note 3, at 670.
14. S. REP. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4864, 4866.
15. Shelton, supra note 4, at 120. The detainer may be lodged by a prosecutor or police
official as a means of punishing the prisoner without an adjudication of guilt by causing
curtailment of prison privileges and parole. It may also be used as a threat to encourage the
prisoner to make restitution. Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal
Services in the Criminal-Correctional Process, 18 U. KAN. L. REv. 493, 581-82 (1970).
16. Dauber, supra note 3, at 670-71.
17. Shelton, supra note 4, at 120-23.
18. H. KEmRPF & J. KEEPER, LEGA RIGHrs OF THE CoNviCr 494-95 (1974). The Model
Penal Code § 305.18 recommends parole to a detainer. By federal regulation, detainers lodged
against a federal prisoner no longer automatically preclude parole consideration. 28 C.F.R. §
2.3 (1977).
19. The inmate who has a detainer against him is filled with anxiety and appre-
hension and frequently does not respond to a training program. He often must be kept
in close custody, which bars him from treatment such as trustyships, moderations of
custody and opportunity for transfer to farms and work camps. In many jurisdictions
he is not eligible for parole, there is little hope for his release after an optimum period
of training and treatment, when he is ready to return to society with an excellent
possibility that he will not offend again. Instead, he often becomes embittered with
continued institutionalization and the objective of the correctional system is defeated.
COUNCIL OF STATE GovERNmENTs, HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL 86 (rev. ed. 1949),
quoted in Dauber, supra note 3, at 671.
20. See Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
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charge underlying a detainer is valid and the restrictions are ration-
ally related to prison security, courts will not overrule the judgment
of prison authorities.2'
B. Speedy Trial
Although detainers have withstood constitutional attack, in
recent years the validity of the underlying charges has been at-
tacked successfully on speedy trial grounds.22 Originally, the courts
considered speedy trial inapplicable to prisoners since the original
policy for affording an accused a speedy trial was to prevent lengthy
pretrial confinement with its attendant embarrassment and anxi-
ety,23 difficulties not experienced by a prisoner. Additionally, the
sixth amendment was not considered binding on the states until
1967, when the Supreme Court held in Klopfer v. North Carolina 1
that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the speedy trial guar-
antee. Even then, however, a prosecuting jurisdiction could wait
until a prisoner had completed his sentence in another state before
bringing him to trial, regardless of the length of the delay, since a
prosecutor had no duty to try a prisoner until he legally could com-
pel his presence in court.2 5 The detainer had no coercive legal effect
on prison officials, who honored it only as a matter of comity. Fur-
thermore, a state court in the prosecuting jurisdiction had no power
to compel production of a prisoner incarcerated in another state.
2 6
Courts also denied prisoners' speedy trial claims on the ground that
one imprisoned for a crime was unavailable for trial because of his
own actions.2 1 Unless a prisoner could show he had no knowledge of
the pending charges, his failure to demand immediate trial consti-
tuted a waiver of the right to a speedy trial.28
The Court in Smith v. Hooey 9 rejected the rationale that a
state was under no duty to promptly try a prisoner whose presence
21. See id. See also Pollard v. State, 128 Ga. App. 470, 197 S.E.2d 158 (1973) (lodging
detainer by proper officials does not violate sixth, eighth, or fourteenth amendments); State
v. Dowd, 234 Ind. 152, 124 N.E.2d 208 (1955) (prisoner delivered to federal authorities for trial
was not deprived of due process).
22. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial ... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
23. Yackle, Taking Stock of Detainer Statutes, 8 Loy. L.A. L. Rav. 88, 102 (1975).
24. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
25. Wexler & Hershey, supra note 2, at 755.
26. Id. See Henderson v. Circuit Court, 392 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1968); McCary v. Kansas,
281 F.2d 185 (10th Cir. 1960).
27. United States v. Fouts, 166 F. Supp. 38, 42 (S.D. Ohio), affl'd, 258 F.2d 402 (6th
Cir. 1958).
28. Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
29. 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
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it could not legally compel, noting that prisoners normally will be
produced at the request of the prosecuting jurisdiction through com-
ity." The Court also pointed out that a prisoner suffers as much as
any other defendant from pretrial delay. In either case, the loss of
witnesses and evidence impairs the ability of the accused to defend
himself." The state's duty was defined in Smith v. Hooey as a good
faith, diligent effort to bring the prisoner to its court for trial upon
his demand.2 The Court did not specifically state whether failure
to protect the prisoner's right to a speedy trial would result in dis-
missal with prejudice. In Dickey v. Florida,33 the Court implied that
actual prejudice must be shown before a conviction will be reversed
on speedy trial grounds. 4 In Barker v. Wingo,35 however, the Court
set forth four factors to be analyzed case-by-case in determining
whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated .3 The Court
held that the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, whether
the defendant demanded trial, and whether actual prejudice re-
sulted should be balanced and interrelated. 7 Rejecting the
"demand-waiver" doctrine, which viewed failure to demand a
speedy trial as a voluntary waiver of the right, the Court reasoned
that presuming waiver of a fundamental right from inaction was
inconsistent with the requirement of "intentional relinquishment"
developed in other waiver cases.3 The defendant who fails to assert
the right, however, has a much greater burden of proving denial of
the right.39 In 1973, the Court clarified the sanction for violation of
the speedy trial right in Strunk v. United States.4" Although the
Court acknowledged that dismissal of an indictment is an
"'unsatisfactorily severe remedy,'" it nevertheless reasoned that
"[i]n light of the policies which underlie the right to a speedy trial,
dismissal must remain, as Barker noted, 'the only possible rem-
edy.' "41
30. Id. at 377.
31. Id. at 378-80.
32. Id. at 383. However, a prisoner against whom a detainer for parole or probation
violation has been lodged does not have a due process right to a prompt revocation hearing.
Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976); United States ex rel. Caruso v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 570 F.2d 1150 (3d Cir. 1978).
33. 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
34. See id. at 38.
35. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
36. Id. at 530.
37. Id. at 530-33.
38. Id. at 525-28. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Note, Right to Speedy
Trial: Maintaining a Proper Balance Between the Interests of Society and the Rights of the
Accused, 4 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. REv. 242, 245 (1974).
39. 407 U.S. at 531-32.
40. 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
41. Id. at 439-40. In Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973), the Court repeated its
1022 [Vol. 31:1017
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Smith v. Hooey and Barker v. Wingo defined the constitutional
right to a speedy trial in qualitative terms, the Court preferring to
evaluate the prejudicial effect of and reasons for the delay on the
facts of each case rather than setting fixed time limits beyond which
the right was conclusively presumed to be violated and within which
the delay was permissible. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers,
on the other hand, is a legislative solution to the specific problems
associated with detainers. Procedures are provided for invoking the
protection of the Agreement, and specific time limits are set for
compliance. The following section describes the Agreement's proce-
dures and discusses state court interpretation and construction of
its provisions.
III. How THE AGREEMENT WORKS
A. Brief Overview of Procedures
Article I sets forth the purposes of the Agreement. First, be-
cause detainers based on untried charges create uncertainties and
obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation, the
Agreement's objective is "to encourage the expeditious and orderly
disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status
of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations,
or complaints."4 Second, because of the difficulties encountered in
obtaining prisoners from other states for trial, the Agreement seeks
to provide cooperative procedures for the interstate transfer of pris-
oners. 3 The first purpose of the Agreement-to provide a means by
which prisoners may request trial on charges underlying de-
tainers-is dealt with in article III. An inmate serving a term of
imprisonment in a party state may force disposition of all charges44
underlying detainers lodged against him by another party state by
serving written notice and "request for final disposition"4 on the
appropriate prosecuting official and court in which the charges are
pending.4" The prisoner then must be brought to trial within 180
assertion in Barker that actual prejudice need not be proven and that "no court should
overlook the possible impact pending charges might have on a prisoner's prospects for parole
and meaningful rehabilitation." Id. at 27.
42. IAD, art. I.
43. Id. Article II defines the terms "State," which includes the United States, "Sending
State," and "Receiving State."
44. A request concerning any one charge operates as a request for disposition of all
charges underlying detainers emanating from any prosecutor in that state. Id. at art. m11(d).
45. Id.
46. The prisoner is supposed to give his request to the warden, who is to forward
it along with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is
being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence,
1978] 1023
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days "after he shall have caused [the request] to be delivered."47
Failure to try the prisoner within this period results in dismissal of
the indictment with prejudice. 8 The court may, however, grant rea-
sonable or necessary continuances for good cause.49
The second problem identified by the drafters of the Agree-
ment, the absence of procedures for transferring prisoners for trial,
is addressed in article IV. By subplnitting a "written request for
temporary custody or availability,"5 the prosecuting jurisdiction
may obtain the prisoner for trial, which in the absence of permissi-
ble continuances must be commenced within 120 days of the pris-
oner's arrival in the receiving state. Both articles III and IV require
that trial be held prior to the prisoner's return "to the original place
of imprisonment ' 5 ' on pain of dismissal. The time periods of both
articles are tolled when the prisoner is unable to stand trial.
52
B. The Agreement and the StatesO
Relatively little case law dealing with the Agreement exists in
most party states, perhaps because the procedures work well and
thus generate little litigation, perhaps because prisoners are una-
ware to a large extent of their rights under the Agreement. Judicial
interpretations of the Agreement generally have dealt with three
major issues: (1) When does the Agreement apply; (2) What are the
the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any
decision of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.
Id. at art. I(a).
47. Id. See text accompanying notes 100-02 infra.
48. If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of
said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information, or complaint
on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the
period provided in article III or article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction
where the indictment, information, or complaint has been pending shall enter an order
dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of
any force or effect.
IAD, art. V(c).
49. Id. at art. m(a). The prisoner or his counsel must be present.
50. Id. at art. IV. "Availability" refers to article V(a), which permits the federal govern-
ment to retain custody over a federal prisoner requested by a state prosecutor while making
the prisoner available for trial. Any request by a receiving state is subject to approval by the
governor of the sending state. Id. at art. IV(a).
51. Id. at art. IV(e). See also id. at art. III(a).
52. Id. at art. VI(a). Other relevant portions of the Agreement will be discussed as they
pertain to judicial interpretation of the statute.
53. This section deals primarily with state court interpretations of the Agreement. The
federal courts, however, have also been involved in interpreting the Agreement through state
prisoners' petitions for habeas corpus. Additionally, federal court decisions are discussed in
this section in so far as they deal with problems that are common to the working of the
Agreement among states alone. The peculiar problems of applying the Agreement to the
United States as a "receiving state" are discussed in Part IV.
1024
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prisoner's duties under the Agreement; and (3) When will the sanc-
tion of dismissal of the indictment with prejudice be invoked
against the prosecuting jurisdiction?
(1) Scope of the Agreement
The first requirement courts have inferred from the Agreement
is that both the sending state and the receiving state must be parties
to the compact.54 Thus, one important reason for federal adoption
of the Agreement was to provide protection for federal prisoners
with state detainers lodged against them.55 The Agreement's protec-
tion does not extend to charges against the prisoner that are pending
in another federal district.56 Moreover, the Agreement does not
apply to detainers lodged against persons incarcerated while await-
ing trial, 57 nor to detainers based on parole or probation violations"
or convictions" because the purpose of the Agreement is to prevent
uncertainties and interference with programs of treatment and re-
habilitation. An imprisoned defendant awaiting trial presumably is
not involved in such programs. Similarly, a detainer based on a
certainty-conviction or parole revocation-does not require imme-
diate disposition. 0
Although the filing of a detainer appears to be a necessary
prerequisite to invocation of the Agreement, that has become one
of the most controversial aspects of the Agreement, particularly at
the federal level. The Agreement does not purport to force the
prosecutor to act upon "untried but unpursued" charges, but only
upon those underlying a detainer and thereby restricting the pris-
oner's activities within the institution and affecting chances for pa-
role. 2 The Iowa Supreme Court recently dealt with a prisoner's right
54. "Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correc-
tional institution of a party state and whenever during the continuance of the term of impris-
onment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment. . ." (Emphasis
added). TAD, art. Im(a). See Smith v. State, 258 Ark. 533, 528 S.W.2d 359 (1957).
55. See Hurst v. Hogan, 435 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (federal prisoner must follow
IAD procedures to dispose of party state's detainer, but for detainer of nonmember state, may
use procedures set up by the Northern District of Georgia before the federal government
joined the Agreement); Wexler & Hershey, supra note 2, at 757.
56. United States v. Krohn, 558 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Cappucci,
342 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
57. United States v. Roberts, 548 F.2d 665 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Boyd, 437
F. Supp. 519 (W.D. Pa. 1977); United States v. Simmons, 437 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Pa. 1977);
Davidson v. State, 18 Md. App. 61, 305 A.2d 474 (1973).
58. Suggs v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 242, 215 S.E.2d 246 (1975).
59. Gaches v. Third Judicial Dist., 416 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (detainer based
on defendant's guilty plea with delayed execution of sentence not under IAD).
60. Nor is there a due process right to a prompt revocation hearing. See note 32 supra.
61. See Part IV infra.
62. State v. Wood, 241 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Iowa 1976). Although there is no statutory right
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under article III of the Agreement to request disposition of charges
pending in another jurisdiction. 3 The prisoner had asked to be tried
before the prosecutor lodged a detainer.4 The court held that the
Agreement applied since the prosecutor subsequently filed a detai-
ner, but that the 180 day time limit did not begin to run until formal
notice was sent by the prison warden.65
An important question arising under article IV, which permits
the prosecuting jurisdiction to request temporary custody of the
prisoner, is whether the Agreement is the exclusive means of obtain-
ing a prisoner for trial. This issue arises primarily when the federal
government participates as a "receiving state,"6 but was first dis-
cussed in the context of a state prosecutor's request in the influen-
tial case of United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes.67 Esola, a federal
prisoner at Danbury, Connecticut, was brought to New Jersey for
trial on state charges pursuant to a state court writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum. 5 He was returned to Danbury and brought back
to New Jersey several times before being tried and convicted.69 The
issue was whether these transfers were governed by the Agreement
and the defendant thus entitled to dismissal of the indictment
under article IV.70 The government argued that the transfers were
not made pursuant to the Agreement, but were judicial writs hon-
ored as a matter of comity by the federal custodian,7' and also that
no detainer was or could have been filed.72 The Third Circuit, fore-
shadowing its interpretation of the Agreement when the federal
government is a receiving state,7 3 held that the Agreement provides
the exclusive means of transfer of a prisoner for prosecution whether
or not the demanding state utilizes article IV's procedures to request
under IAD to disposition of charges on which no detainer has been lodged, the prisoner still
has a constitutional right to a speedy trial. See text accompanying notes 29-41 supra.
63. State v. Wood, 241 N.W.2d 8 (Iowa 1976).
64. Id. at 10-11.
65. Id. at 11-12.
66. See Part IV infra.
67. 520 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1975).
68. Id. at 832. See the discussion of federal writs in Part IV(A) infra. The state writ is
universally considered to have no effect beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the state court,
although there is a split of authority as to the effect of a federal court writ.
69. Id. at 832-33.
70. The case came before the Third Circuit on the prisoner's petition for habeas corpus.
He had previously filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in state court, thus exhausting
his state remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970). 520 F.2d at 832-33.
71. 520 F.2d at 836.
72. Id. Esola had been arraigned on the state charges and released on bail prior to
beginning his federal sentence; thus no detainer could have been lodged with the federal
warden.
73. United States v. Sorrell, 562 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1977). See text accompanying notes
235-48 infra.
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a prisoner. 74 The court emphasized the Agreement's purpose of min-
imizing interference with rehabilitation:
The purpose of the provision [article IV(e)] . . . is to minimize the adverse
impact of a foreign prosecution on rehabilitative programs of the confining
jurisdiction. When a prisoner is needlessly shuttled between two jurisdictions,
then any meaningful participation in an ongoing treatment program is effec-
tively foreclosed for two reasons. First, participation requires physical presence
and the continuous physical presence of a prisoner is not possible when multi-
ple trips to a foreign jurisdiction are made. Secondly, the psychological strain
resulting from uncertainty about any future sentence decreases an inmate's
desire to take advantage of institutional opportunities.7 5
Groomes had important effects upon subsequent interpretation
of the Agreement. First, it held that the sanctions of article IV(e)
applied even though the requesting jurisdiction had not intended to
proceed under the Agreement.76 It also broadened the scope of the
Agreement by holding that a state court writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum constitutes a detainer for purposes of the Agree-
ment." Although the state court writ, like its federal counterpart,7"
is generally executed immediately and thus does not entail the re-
strictions associated with ordinary detainers, the court did not dis-
cuss these differences. Instead, it emphasized the effects of transfer-
ring prisoners between jurisdictions. 7 The Agreement originally
stressed the detainer's interference with rehabilitation through its
effect on a prisoner's chances for parole, prison jobs, and minimum
security confinement, and the psychological effect of these restric-
tions.80 Article III provided the solution to this problem by permit-
ting the prisoner to end these restrictions by forcing the prosecutor
to try him. In contrast, article IV was originally intended to deal
with the prosecutor's need to obtain prisoners from other states for
trial rather than with the prisoner's problems. Article IV(e) and the
120 day "speedy trial" limit were simply to prevent abuse of the new
procedure.8 ' Groomes and its progeny8 2 thus injected a new element
into the Agreement-concern for the effect of transfers between ju-
risdictions on rehabilitation-when no such concern existed on the
part of the drafters of the Agreement.
74. 520 F.2d at 836.
75. Id. at 836-37.
76. Id. at 837-38.
77. Id. at 838-39.
78. See Part IV infra.
79. 520 F.2d at 837.
80. See text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
81. See S. REP. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4864, 4865-66.
82. See text accompanying notes 235-48 infra.
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A New York court recently has taken the opposite view, holding
that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is not the sole means of
obtaining a prisoner from another jurisdiction for trial. In People v.
Valenti,8 3 when a federal prisoner incarcerated in Missouri was
brought to New York in connection with several federal indict-
ments, a New York state court issued a writ of habeas corpus ad pro-
sequendum 8' in order to arraign him on state charges.85 Upon his
return to Missouri, the defendant moved to dismiss the state indict-
ment on the ground that article IV(e) of the Agreement86 required
that he be tried prior to his return to the original place of imprison-
ment." The New York court rejected the prisoner's claim, holding
that the Agreement was inapplicable because the prisoner's appear-
ances in state court were effected pursuant to the judicial writ,
authorized by a different section of the New York code. The Agree-
ment was deemed an alternative to the writ, applying only when a
true detainer has been lodged.8
(2) Requirement of a Demand
Unlike the constitutional right to a speedy trial," article II
does not oblige the prosecuting authority filing a detainer to at-
tempt to bring the prisoner to trial absent a demand by him." This
requirement has been criticized as ignoring the prosecutor's affirma-
tive constitutional duty to attempt to bring the prisoner to trial
promptly, irrespective of whether the prisoner has demanded trial."
Legitimate functional differences exist, however, between the pris-
oner's remedies under the Agreement and under the constitutional
right to a speedy trial. The "speedy trial" provisions of the Act were
designed to encourage disposition of charges when detainers were
interfering with the rehabilitative process rather than to serve as a
"constitutional rule of thumb" for determining whether the consti-
tutional right has been violated.2 The Agreement, unlike the consti-
tutional right, fixes absolute time limits that require dismissal even
though actual prejudice to the prisoner cannot be shown. 3 No bal-
83. 90 Misc. 2d 904, 396 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Monroe County Ct. 1977).
84. Authorized by N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 580.30 (McKinney 1971).
85. 90 Misc. 2d at 905, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
86. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 580.20 (McKinney 1971).
87. 90 Misc. 2d at 905, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
88. Id. at 907, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 324.
89. See text accompanying notes 29-41 supra.
90. United States v. Dowl, 394 F. Supp. 1250, 1255 (D. Minn. 1975); see Ekis v. Dart,
217 Kan. 817, 539 P.2d 16 (1975).
91. Yackle, supra note 23, at 111.
92. Commonwealth v. Bunter, 445 Pa. 413, 423, 282 A.2d 705, 709-10 (1971).
93. Id. But see Stroble v. Egeler, 547 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1977) (remanding the case for
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ancing is required. 4 The Agreement was designed to avoid lengthy
inquiry into the facts of each case and to relieve the prisoner of the
burden of showing actual prejudice. 5
A frequently litigated issue is the sufficiency of the prisoner's
demand, or "request for final disposition," under article III. What
must the prisoner do to invoke the protection of the Agreement and
put the prosecutor on notice that he must try him? In light of the
remedial aims of the statute and the provision that the agreement
shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes," most courts
have been reluctant to burden the prisoner with formal procedural
requirements. According to the prevailing view, the prisoner must
simply give his written request for disposition of the charges under-
lying a detainer to the prison warden or other correctional official,
who is under an absolute duty to see that it is transmitted to the
proper officials in the prosecuting state along with a certificate
containing certain information about the prisoner's sentence.
The prisoner's request starts the running of the 180 day time limit
even if the warden fails to offer temporary custody of the prisoner
to the prosecuting state." The statute does not clearly state whether
the prisoner's request actually must be received by the prosecutor
in order to begin the 180 day period. 10 Although no case has been
reported in which charges are dismissed when the prosecuting juris-
diction failed to receive actual notice of the prisoner's request,
courts have been concerned lest the prisoner's attempt to invoke
an evidentiary hearing to determine, inter alia, whether the defendant had been prejudiced
by unauthorized delay and whether the indictment should be dismissed absent such preju-
dice).
94. Compare the speedy trial balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972).
95. For the requirement that a prisoner be tried prior to his return to the original place
of imprisonment, however, some requirement of prejudice might be advisable. See also State
v. Lippolis, 55 N.J. 354, 262 A.2d 203 (1970) (adopting the position of the dissenting judge in
the court below, 107 N.J. Super. 137, 237 A.2d 705 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969), that the
prosecution may request continuance after time limits have run, especially when the defen-
dant can show no prejudice due to the delay). The view taken in Lippolis was expressly
rejected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Fisher, 451 Pa. 102, 301
A.2d 605 (1973).
96. IAD, art. IX.
97. United States v. Mason, 372 F. Supp. 651, 653-54 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Pittman v.
State, 301 A.2d 509 (Del. 1973).
98. Pittman v. State, 301 A.2d 509 (Del. 1973).
99. Rockmore v. State, 21 Ariz. App. 388, 519 P.2d 877 (1974); People v. Esposito, 37
Misc. 2d 386, 201 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Queens County Ct. 1960) (such procedural formalities as
sending by registered mail are not the prisoner's responsibility).
100. IAD, art. III provides: "[Hie shall be brought to trial within one hundred and
eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer. . . written
notice. . . . The written notice. . . shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden...
who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate . .. .
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the Agreement "be defeated by ineptitude"'01 on the part of either
state's officials. At least one state has clarified the procedure by
providing that the time limit does not start to run until notice
actually is received by the prosecuting jurisdiction. 02
Other courts have stressed that the prisoner must at least make
a good faith attempt to comply with the formal procedures of the
Agreement. In Beebe v. State,13 the Delaware court stated that
strict compliance with the Agreement's procedures is not required
if the prisoner diligently attempts to comply and, through official
oversight or error, the formal requirements are not met. The pris-
oner, however, should not attempt to communicate directly with the
prosecuting jurisdiction, but should send his request to the war-
den.' 4 If the prisoner ignores the wardeh, his failure to comply will
be fatal to his request. The 180 day limit runs from the date the
prisoner requests that the warden send the IAD forms. 05 Similarly,
in Ekis v. Darr,"' the court held that a prisoner's letter or petition,
initially sent to the district attorney and the wrong court, was insuf-
ficient to invoke the Agreement because he failed to follow the cor-
rect procedure when informed of it by the prosecutor. The court was
concerned that the prisoner's request be recognized as an LAD proce-
dure:
[The prisoner's] failure to act in response to the [district attorney's] letter
is readily susceptible to an inference that he was ambushing the Kansas au-
thorities. He wanted his demand to be on file, but didn't want anyone to know
it was a proceeding under the Agreement.
From the prosecution's point of view it was vitally important to know
whether or not Ekis was proceeding under the Agreement."'?
(3) Penalties
Discussion of the sufficiency of a prisoner's request raises the
issue of the effect of a prison official's failure to fulfill his obligations
under the Agreement. The warden's duties include: (1) Informing
the prisoner promptly of "the source and contents of any detainer
101. People v. Esposito, 37 Misc. 2d 386, 391, 201 N.Y.S.2d 83, 88 (Queens County Ct.
1960).
102. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 6160. See Davidson v. State, 18 Md. App. 61, 305 A.2d
474 (1973).
103. 346 A.2d 169 (Del. 1975). The prisoner's IAD claim was also denied in Beebe v.
Vaughn, 430 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Del. 1977), where the court held that a federal court has
habeas corpus jurisdiction to consider a prisoner's claim even though the United States was
not a party to the transaction under the Agreement.
104. 346 A.2d at 171.
105. Id.
106. 217 Kan. 817, 539 P.2d 16 (1975).
107. Id. at 823, 539 P.2d at 22.
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lodged against him;" 08 (2) Informing the prisoner of his rights under
the Agreement;'0 ' (3) Furnishing a certificate with information
about the prisoner and his sentence to the prosecuting jurisdic-
tion;"' (4) Forwarding the prisoner's request and the certificate to
"the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or cer-
tified mail, return receipt requested;""' (5) Notifying all appropri-
ate prosecutors and courts in the state of the prisoner's request for
disposition of a charge underlying a detainer from that state (be-
cause the prisoner's request concerning one detainer from State X
operates as a request for disposition of all detainers from State X,
and the prisoner must be tried on all charges prior to his return to
the sending state);"'2 (6) Notifying all prosecutors in a state who
have lodged detainers against a prisoner when one prosecutor from
that state requests temporary custody of the prisoner under Article
IV (it is unclear whether these prosecutors must bring the prisoner
to trial before his return to the sending state); 's and (7) Offering
temporary custody of the prisoner to the appropriate authority in
the receiving state, once a request is made under articles In or IV.
The offer is to accompany the prisoner's request under article lI."
The warden who has custody of the prisoner is under an abso-
lute duty to perform the duties listed above."5 Many states have
added an additional clause to the Agreement similar to the following
section of the Georgia statute: "It shall be lawful and mandatory
upon the warden or other official in charge of a penal or correctional
institution in this State to give over the person of any inmate thereof
whenever so required by the operation of the Agreement on De-
tainers." 6 The purpose of the Agreement is to provide a legal basis
for the detainer, so that the warden honors the detainer or request
as a statutory duty rather than as a matter of comity. The sanction
for violation of the warden's statutory duties under the Agreement,
however, actually lies against the prosecuting jurisdiction."7
108. IAD, art. I(c).
109. Id.
110. Id. at art. mll(a).
111. Id. at art. lI(b).
112. Id. at art. I(d).
113. Id. at aft. IV(b).
114. Id. at art. V(a).
115. See, e.g., Pittman v. State, 301 A.2d 509 (Del. 1973); People v. Esposito, 37 Misc.
2d 386, 201 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Queens County Ct. 1960).
116. GA. CODE ANN. § 77-514b (1977 Cum. Supp.); see, e.g., IDAHo CODE § 19-5006 (1977
Cum. Supp.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-8-9(e) (Smith-Hurd 1973).
117. There is a remedy against the warden-an action brought in the court in the
jurisdiction in which the prisoner is incarcerated, to order the warden to end restrictions due
to the detainer-which has no effect on the underlying charges. See Lawrence v. Blackwell,
298 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
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The state courts are split on the extent to which the prosecuting
jurisdiction is responsible for the failure of the other state's officials
to comply with the Agreement. Often the prosecuting state fulfills
its duties under the Agreement, yet finds its indictment challenged
because of the actions of the other state. The prevailing view, based
on the Agreement's remedial purpose, is that each party state is
bound by the official acts or omissions of the other party state."'
The consequences of this imputed responsibility are illustrated in
Nelms v. State. "9 A Tennessee prosecutor requested temporary cus-
tody under article IV of an Iowa prisoner who subsequently re-
quested trial pursuant to article III. The Iowa warden informed
Tennessee that two other states had lodged prior detainers. The
Tennessee prosecutor, apparently assuining that the prisoner was
unavailable at that time, 110 did nothing until six months later, when
he successfully requested temporary custody. Despite Iowa's admis-
sion of error in failing to notify Tennessee that the prisoner was
available and to offer custody at the time of the first request, the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that the indictment must be dis-
missed with prejudice based on Tennessee's failure to promptly re-
spond to the. prisoner's article III request. The court rejected the
state's argument that it should not be penalized for the sending
state's negligence, noting that the alternative would be to put the
burden on the prisoner, who is in no position to see that prison
authorities perform their duties.121 Thus, the prosecuting jurisdic-
tion bears the affirmative responsibility not only of discharging its
specific duties as outlined by the Agreement, but also of seeing that
prison authorities perform their functions.1
2
The Agreement as above construed requires constant vigilance
and awareness of time limits by the prosecutor. Lack of proper
response by sending-state prison authorities neither tolls the run-
ning of time limits nor relieves the prosecutor of the burden of
bringing the prisoner to trial. From the prisoner's viewpoint, this
requirement serves the Agreement's purpose of ending the uncer-
118. Nelms v. State, 532 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1976).
119. 532 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn. 1976).
120. The time limits of articles I and IV are tolled automatically whenever the pris-
oner is unavailable for trial, such as when he is standing trial in another state. See Price v.
State, 237 Ga. 352, 357, 227 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1976) (Hill, J., concurring specially); State v.
Wood, 241 N.W.2d 8, 13-14 (Iowa 1976).
121. 532 S.W.2d at 926-27. Writing in dissent, Justice Harbison argued that Tennessee
should not be penalized for Iowa's failure to comply with the Agreement. Id. at 928.
122. See, e.g., People v. Esposito, 37 Misc. 2d 386, 394-95, 201 N.Y.S.2d 83, 91 (Queens
County Ct. 1960) (the prosecutor manifested proper awareness of his own responsibilities
according to the court, but failed to press the prison authorities to perform the duty of offering
temporary custody).
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tainties associated with pending charges for which detainers have
been lodged. Realistically the prisoner should not be burdened with
formal procedural requirements, especially since he ordinarily is not
represented by counsel. The courts have recognized that he is in no
position to oversee the warden and compel compliance with the
Agreement. On the other hand, consideration of the prosecutor's
position indicates the unfairness of penalizing the charging state for
omissions by the custodial state. The Agreement's penalty of dis-
missal with prejudice is intentionally harsh to prevent abuse of the
detainer and to encourage prompt and speedy disposition of pending
charges. A prosecutor who fails to act diligently to try a prisoner
pursuant to his request cannot complain if the indictment is dis-
missed. The prosecutor's diligence is irrelevant, however, if the
prison authority neglects his duties under the Act, for the prosecutor
then becomes vicariously responsible and again faces dismissal of a
valid indictment. Given the broad range of the warden's duties
under the Agreement, his inaction often might result in dismissal
of another jurisdiction's indictment. For example, if the warden
fails to notify all other prosecutors in a state of a prisoner's request
for disposition of a detainer filed by a prosecutor in that state, the
prisoner could attack the charges underlying those other detainers
if he is not tried before his return to prison. The Agreement provides
no remedy for encouraging compliance by prison officials without
punishing the prosecutor by dismissal of the charges.ln
Controversy also exists over the prosecutor's obligations once
the prisoner arrives in the prosecuting jurisdiction for trial, whether
by his own request or by the prosecutor's initiative. Three possible
requirements may trigger dismissal of the indictment: (1) The 180
day limit under article HI, running from the time the prisoner's
article HI request is received by the prosecutor. A continuance for
good cause is possible; (2) The 120 day limit under article IV, run-
ning from the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state. This limit
applies only when the prosecutor requests custody'24 and a continu-
ance for good cause is permitted; and (3) The requirement under
articles I(d) and IV(e) that "[i]f trial is not had on any indict-
ment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the
return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such
indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further
force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the
same with prejudice."'
' 25
123. But see note 117 supra.
124. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 451, 453 n.3, 331 A.2d 792, 793 n.3
(1974); State v. George, 271 N.C. 438, 444, 156 S.E.2d 845, 849 (1967).
125. IAD, art. ml(d). The wording of IAD, art. IV(e) is nearly identical.
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The prevailing view construes the Agreement literally and in
favor of the prisoner. One view, espoused by the Pennsylvania
courts, holds that any unexcused delay that violates the time limits
and is not caused by the defendant mandates dismissal.
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 1 21 the most extreme example of this view,
stated that the prosecutor's diligence is immaterial. The prisoner
initially requested trial in the Pennsylvania court on June 1, 1973.
Defense counsel then requested a continuance, and trial was set for
October 24. On that date, defendant moved to dismiss "under the
misconception that the time proscription under the Act was 120
rather than 180 days."' 27 The judge reserved ruling on the motion
and due to "inexplicable inadvertence" lost track of the case for
months. The trial judge's dismissal of the indictment due to its own
error was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which held
that the trial court's "administrative inadvertence" required dis-
missal: "[]t is unimportant whether delay is occasioned by the
prosecutor's office or by the court; so long as the delay is neither
reasonable nor necessary, and not occasioned by the defendant, the
legislative policy must be heeded."''
A recent case illustrates the Pennsylvania court's belief that the
prohibition against return of the prisoner to the sending state prior
to trial also should be strictly enforced. In Commonwealth v.
Merlo, 129Pennsylvania authorities requested temporary custody of
a federal prisoner in Connecticut. Before trial 3 defendant was re-
turned to federal prison because his federal sentence was to end the
next month. Upon release from federal custody, defendant voluntar-
ily returned to Pennsylvania and moved for dismissal under article
IV(e). The appellate court ordered dismissal of all charges, despite
the state's argument that defendant's return to federal prison fur-
thered the Agreement's purposes by minimizing interference with
the federal rehabilitation program. 31 Rejecting the state's premise
that the Agreement does not apply when the prisoner's original
sentence ends before expiration of the 120 days the receiving state
has to try him, the court emphasized the Groomes3 1 notion that the
prisoner should not be shuttled back and forth between states. The
court clearly stated that failure either to try the defendant within
126. 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 451, 331 A.2d 792 (1974).
127. Id. at 453, 331 A.2d at 793.
128. Id. at 454, 331 A.2d at 794.
129. 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 517, 364 A.2d 391 (1976).
130. Several trial dates were set, but witnesses failed to appear. Id. at 520, 364 A.2d at
393.
131. Id. at 523, 364 A.2d at 394-95.
132. 520 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1975).
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120 days or prior to his return to prison mandates dismissal of the
charges,' 3 noting that the Agreement is clear and permits no excep-
tions.'
34
Other courts have been more reluctant to invoke the severe
sanction of dismissal with prejudice, especially when the delay
can be attributed to the defendant. The Pennsylvania court in the
Wilson case' 35 recognized that the Agreement should be read to omit
from the statutory time limits any delay caused by the defendant.
Other courts, however, have interpreted this exception more
broadly. Several New York cases indicate that the article IV(e)
provision requiring trial prior to defendant's return to the original
place of imprisonment applies only when the defendant declares
himself ready for trial. For example, pretrial motions by the prisoner
may indicate lack of readiness and a return to the original prison
will not invoke the penalty of article IV(e). In People v. Bernstein,1 3'
a federal prisoner was brought to New York for arraignment on state
charges. After making several pretrial motions, the prisoner was
returned to federal prison. The court held that no article IV(e) claim
arises until all defense motions are completed and the defendant is
ready for trial. To hold otherwise, the court noted, requires an im-
practical and unduly harsh interpretation that would restrict defen-
dants' appearances in state courts for pretrial motions.1 37 In People
v. White, 3 a Connecticut prisoner brought to New York pursuant
to article IV was not tried within the 120 day limit. Nonetheless, the
court held that a motion to suppress evidence made after expiration
of the time limit constituted a waiver of the prisoner's right to
compel dismissal under IV(e), on the ground that a hearing on such
a motion is considered part of the trial and the defendant mani-
fested an intent to continue to trial.1 3' The Illinois Supreme Court
recently held in Neville v. Friedman"' that article IV(e) does not
require dismissal when the defendant, at his request, has been
granted a long, indefinite continuance and has been returned to the
original place of imprisonment without objection on his part. The
court noted that a literal reading of article IV(e), which contains no
exception to the prohibition against return prior to trial, would con-
tradict the underlying purpose of the statute to promote rehabilita-
133. 242 Pa. Super. Ct. at 525, 364 A.2d at 394-95.
134. Id.
135. 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 451, 331 A.2d 792 (1974).
136. 74 Misc. 2d 714, 344 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Dutchess County Ct. 1973).
137. Id. at 715, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 787-88.
138. 33 App. Div. 2d 217, 305 N.Y.S.2d 875 (1969).
139. Id. at 221, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
140. 67 Ill. 2d 488, 367 N.E.2d 1341 (1977).
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tion since the detention facility of the receiving state was meant for
short-term incarceration and thus not equipped for rehabilitation
and training:
Such interference is not in the best interests of petitioner, for whose benefit
the programs are designed, nor of a society interested in the rehabilitation of
its offending members. By contrast, we can discern no useful purpose to be
accomplished by holding petitioner in the Sangamon County jail during that
period, and he does not argue that any exists.'
Application of the Agreement among party states thus is by no
means uniform. Some states have applied the Agreement as literally
as possible in order to give the greatest possible protection to the
prisoner; others, while recognizing the need for strong sanctions to
enforce the provisions, are reluctant to grant dismissals when the
prisoner has in some way contributed to the violation or when no
real possibility of prejudice exists. 
1 2
IV. THE INTERSTATE AGREEMENT AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers has proved to be a fairly
workable method of disposing of detainers and producing prisoners
for trial when only states are involved, or when the United States
acts as a "sending state" under the Agreement. Controversy exists,
however, on the extent to which the federal government should be
treated as a "receiving state" under the Agreement. The problem
arises from three fundamental differences between a state and the
United States that cannot be obviated simply by designating the
United States as a "state"1 3 for purposes of the Agreement. The
141. Id.
142. Some question also exists as to the effect of violation of the Agreement-whether
the indictment is automatically extinguished, or whether dismissal requires judicial action.
Despite ambiguous language in the Agreement, courts generally agree that the provisions are
not self-executing. See, e.g., State v. West, 79 N.J. Super. 379, 191 A.2d 758 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1963); People v. White, 33 App. Div. 2d 217, 305 N.Y.S.2d 875 (1969). Prior to dismissal
of the charges, however, the warden in charge of the prisoner may be required to end the
restrictive effects of a detainer if it appears that the charging state violated the Agreement.
Watson v. Ralston, 419 F. Supp. 536 (W.D. Wis. 1976). The court discussed the problems
facing a warden who knows a prosecutor may have violated the Agreement. The warden could
refuse to give temporary custody to the prosecuting state, but this would require the warden
to make a factual and legal determination as to whether IAD was violated, a function of the
court in the receiving state. To ignore any alleged violation until dismissal of the indictment
by giving full effect to the detainer would interfere with rehabilitation. The best course,
concluded the court, is for the warden to end any restrictions based on the detainer, but honor
the prosecutor's request for custody. Id. at 541. To attack the detainer's effects, the prisoner
would file suit in the jurisdiction where he is incarcerated; to challenge the validity of the
underlying charge, he must petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district in which the
charge is pending. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973); Nelson v.
George, 399 U.S. 224 (1970); Campbell v. Virginia, 453 F.2d 1230 (10th Cir. 1972); Baity v.
Ciccone, 379 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
143. LAD, art. 1(a). The drafters of the Agreement contemplated federal participation,
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primary differences are: (1) The United States traditionally has
used the federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to secure
the presence of state prisoners for trial; (2) The jurisdiction of the
United States as a "receiving state" may be geographically concur-
rent with that of the "sending state;" and (3) The United States
frequently uses state institutions as federal detention facilities. Nei-
ther the drafters of the original agreement nor Congress appear to
have foreseen the precise problems of interpretation that have
arisen because of these differences, as evidenced by a lack of com-
mentary on the differences in the original proposal by the Council
of State Governments' and the legislative history of the Agree-
ment' before its passage by Congress.
In the absence of opposition to the IAD in Congress,'" the Act
passed without debate and without penetrating analysis of its po-
tential impact. The strong support for federal adoption of the Agree-
ment by the United States Department of Justice suggests that it
had no idea that the Agreement would affect its longstanding
method of procuring state prisoners.'47 The following section dis-
cusses the nature and history of the federal writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum as a prelude to analysis of the federal case law
interpreting the role of the United States as a "receiving state"
under the Agreement.
A. The Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Prosequendum
A major issue in application of the Agreement to the federal
government is whether the practice of bringing state prisoners to
federal court by issuing writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum
and ad testificandum is subject to the statutory provisions. This
section traces the origin and development of such writs in order to
evaluate the arguments on this question.
Blackstone called the writ of habeas corpus "the most cele-
brated writ in the English law."'' 8 The best known writ is the "Great
and several provisions refer to the United States. See, e.g., IAD, art. 11(a) ("State" shall
mean, inter alia, the United States); LAD, art. V(a) (federal prisoners may remain in federal
custody when sent to the receiving state for trial); LAD, § 3 ("Governor" defined as the
Attorney General with respect to the United States).
144. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL (rev.
ed. 1966), reprinted in ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL (approved draft 1968).
145. S. REP. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4864.
146. Id.
147. See Memorandum from Ezra H. Friedman, Justice Dep't Legislations and
Special Projects Section, to Philip T. White, April 21, 1977, at 33 [hereinafter cited as
Memorandum] (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
148. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129 (1803).
10371978]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Writ" of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, 45 commonly reduced to
"habeas corpus," which is used to bring a prisoner into court in
order to inquire into the legality of his confinement. Blackstone
described several other species of writs, among them the writs of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum and ad testificandum, "which
issue when it is necessary to remove a prisoner, in order to prosecute
or bear testimony in any court, or to be tried in the proper jurisdic-
tion wherein the fact was committed."5 0 In the United States, sec-
tion 14 of the First Judiciary Act of 178911 defined the jurisdiction
of the courts of the United States to issue writs of habeas corpus.
The Judiciary Act's provisions were first construed by Justice Mar-
shall in 1807,12 who emphasized the necessity of an express grant
of power to issue the writs: "for the meaning of the term habeas
corpus, resort may unquestionably be had to the common law; but
the power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United
States, must be given by written law." '53
The leading modem decision on federal habeas corpus, Carbo
v. United States,'54 dealt with the current statutory authority for
issuance of writs of habeas corpus:
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice
thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective juris-
dictions ....
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or...
(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial.'U
The issue in Carbo was whether the limitation that writs of
habeas corpus could be issued by judges only "within their respec-
tive jurisdictions"" meant that a district court had no authority to
issue a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum directed to a prison
official outside the court's territorial jurisdiction. Following the lead
149. Id. at *131.
150. Id. at *130.
151. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73. Section 14 provided in relevant part:
[Tihe courts of the United States, shall have power to issue writs of scire facias,
habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be
necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions .... [W]rits of habeas
corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody,
under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before
some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.
Id. at 81-82 (footnote omitted).
152. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
153. Id. at 93-94.
154. 364 U.S. 611 (1961).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
156. Id. at § 2241(a).
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of Justice Marshall, the Court initially examined the common law
practice and usage of such writs, noting that their purpose was to
secure the presence of prisoners in the proper jurisdiction for trial.'57
It then explored the legislative history behind the present statute
and determined that the -limiting words "within their respective
jurisdictions" applied only to the power to issue writs of habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum. 15' To permit judges to issue writs on behalf
of petitioners far removed from the court would be inconvenient,
expensive, embarrassing, and unnecessary. On the other hand, such
power was essential for the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum
in order to bring a defendant to the proper jurisdiction for trial.5 '
Furthermore, the Court found that the drafters of the amendments
giving the statute its present form disclaimed any intent to change
the substantive law on habeas corpus. 6' Thus, the Court interpreted
the habeas corpus statute in a different manner than its language,
taken on its face without reference to the nature and purpose of the
various writs, would indicate.
The Carbo Court specifically declined to consider the question
whether a federal writ is mandatory upon state officials.' Ordinar-
ily, the custodian state's official delivers the prisoner pursuant to
the federal writ as a matter of comity, and the question never
arises."' State courts, of course, have never had the power to compel
production of prisoners from other states or from federal custodi-
ans."' Prior to enactment of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers,
formal extradition was required. Some courts have assumed in dicta
that a federal writ cannot compel production of a state prisoner and
that the process works only as a matter of comity.' The principle
of comity was used primarily as a means of denying a prisoner
standing to challenge federal transfers pursuant to the writ just as
it was used to deny prisoners the right to a speedy trial prior to
Smith v. Hooey.1"1 Persuasive authority, however, supports the
proposition that since the supremacy clause makes section 224116
157. 364 U.S. at 614-15.
158. Id. at 618-19.
159. Id. at 617.
160. Id. at 619.
161. "In view of the cooperation extended by the New York authorities in honoring the
writ, it is unnecessary to decide what would be the effect of a similar writ absent such
cooperation." Id. at 621 n.20.
162. Id. at 621.
163. See Abelman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
164. See Derengowski v. United States Marshal, 377 F.2d 223 (8th Cir. 1967).
165. 393 U.S. 374 (1969); see Wzesinski v. Amos, 143 F. Supp. 585 (N.D. Ind. 1956).
See also United States v. Oliver, 523 F.2d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 1975).
166. See text accompanying note 155 supra.
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the supreme law of the land, a state official is required to turn over
a prisoner if so ordered by a federal writ."' Because federal courts
have the power to compel the release of a prisoner from state cus-
tody without dependence on comity, the supremacy of federal law
requires obedience by state authorities to a federal writ. '
Thus, while the United States occasionally lodged detainers
against state prisoners, it typically relied upon the federal writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum 69 to obtain prisoners for trial. No
mention of the writ is found in the legislative history of the Agree-
ment on Detainers and no concern for the Agreement's effect on it
surfaced until 1975 when the decisions in United States v. Mauro
1 70
exploded the "time bomb" that had lain dormant since federal
adoption of the Agreement five years earlier.1 71 The following section
will examine the appellate decisions construing the Agreement as
applied to the United States. Analysis will focus on the courts'
treatment of the previously mentioned characteristics of the United
States17 2 that distinguish it from a state for purposes of the Agree-
ment.
B. Federal Case Law Construing the Agreement
(1) The Second Circuit's Interpretation: Mauro, Ford, Chico
The Mauro case, although not the first appellate decision to
consider the federal government's role as a "receiving state" under
167. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 249 (1886); United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d
588, 596-98 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 816 (1977).
168. Where there is state imprisonment and a pending federal prosecution there
is, clearly, no place for the principle of 'comity'. . . . [Tihat authority holding that the
writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is not mandatory is erroneous, since the statu-
tory writ is the supreme law of the land and the imprisoning state has no choice but to
yield the prisoner, anything in its law to the contrary notwithstanding.
Schindler, Interjurisdictional Conflict and the Right to a Speedy Trial, 35 U. CiN. L. Rzv.
179, 191-92 (1966).
169. Section 2241 also authorizes writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum, used to
bring prisoners to testify in federal court. The Carbo Court specifically declined to rule
whether such a writ has extraterritorial effect, and many lower courts have held that a district
court lacks authority to compel production of a prisoner incarcerated outside its district to
testify, at least in civil cases. Clark v. Hendrix, 397 F. Supp. 966 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Silver v.
Dunbar, 264 F. Supp. 177 (S.D. Cal. 1967). Several cases prior to Carbo indicated that the
writ did have extraterritorial effect. See In re Thaw, 166 F. 71 (3d Cir. 1908); Underwood v.
Maloney, 15 F.R.D. 104 (N.D.N.Y. 1954). The Seventh Circuit recently reversed its prior rule
and held that the district court has the power to compel production of prisoner-witnesses from
anywhere in the United States through use of the writ. Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730 (7th
Cir. 1976).
170. 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976),. cert. granted, 434 U.S. 816 (1977).
171. [1978] 22 CRaM. L. REP. (BNA) 4216 (summary of oral argument before the Su-
preme Court).
172. See text accompanying notes 143-44 supra.
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the Agreement, 1 3 was the first to hold that the use of the federal writ
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum sufficed to invoke the Agree-
ment. Two defendants indicted on federal charges while in New
York state prisons174 were brought to federal district court pursuant
to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum for arraignment. After
setting trial dates, the district court175 ordered the defendants to be
returned to state custody because of the crowded condition of the
federal detention facility. Thereafter, each defendant moved for dis-
missal, claiming violation of article IV(e). The district court granted
the motions and dismissed the indictments . 7  Affirming the dis-
missal, two members of the panel 77 held that writs of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum constitute detainers under the Agreement,' rea-
soning that "[a]ny other construction would permit the United
States to evade and circumvent the Agreement by simply utilizing
the traditional writ.'
' 79
Arguing that the Agreement was not intended to regulate the
writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the government contended
that article IV's proviso permitting the governor of the sending state
to disapprove the receiving state's request for temporary custody
excluded the federal writ, a mandatory court order; 18 that the writ,
173. The first federal appellate decision to discuss the applicability of the Agreement
to the federal government as a "receiving state" was United States v. Ricketson, 498 F.2d
367 (7th Cir. 1974). The state prisoner was taken to federal court pursuant to the writ for
pretrial motions, then returned to state custody. Without discussion of the possibility that a
writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum by itself could invoke the Agreement, the court
rejected the prisoner's article IV(e) claim on the ground that no detainer had been lodged
until after these pretrial transfers occurred. Nor did the court discuss whether the writ
constituted a "request" under article IV, although it assumed that it did. The court expressly
declined to consider whether the Agreement is the exclusive means of transfer:
We only note that it appears that the United States Attorney never intended to make a
request under the Agreement in 1972; he wanted custody of defendant for short periods
for particular purposes, but it clearly was not contemplated in March, May or July 1972
that defendant would be held in federal custody until tried.
Id. at 373.
174. The defendants were charged with criminal contempt for refusal to testify before
a federal grand jury.
175. Judge Bartels of the Eastern District of New York was the presiding judge.
176. It was in effect Judge Bartels who violated LAD by ordering defendants' return to
state custody, then dismissing the indictments. Additionally, the government had argued
that defendant Fusco waived his rights under article IV(e) by requesting the return to state
prison. The court rejected this contention on the ground that, as a request to remain in federal
custody made by another prisoner had been denied due to overcrowded conditions, "it would
have been futile for Fusco to make the same request before the same judge." 544 F.2d at 591
n.3. See text accompanying notes 136-40 supra for state views on prisoner waiver.
177. Anderson and Mulligan were the members affirming the dismissal.
178. No federal warrants or other notification apparently had been lodged.
179. 544 F.2d at 592.
180. Id. at 592 & n.5.
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executed immediately, does not adversely affect rehabilitation;8 '
and that to equate the writ with a detainer would repeal the federal
statute authorizing writs of habeas corpus, an improper result ab-
sent specific legislative intent.'82 The government further contended
that the United States adopted the Agreement only as a sending
state.'83 The court rejected the government's interpretation, indicat-
ing that compliance with the writ is solely a matter of comity,"4 that
the Agreement was intended to be the exclusive means of transfer-
ring a prisoner from one party state to another for trial,"' and that
the habeas writ would not be repealed since resort to the writ still
was necessary for transferring prisoners from non-member states. ' 6
Rejecting also the government's attempt to distinguish the writ
from a detainer, the court stated that the uncertainties inherent in
the federal trial and sentencing obviously affected defendants' abil-
ity to participate in rehabilitation programs."' Because the Agree-
ment was designed to prevent prisoners from being "shuttled back
and forth" between the two jurisdictions, the court reasoned,
"[t]he disruptive effect upon the prisoner's morale is the same
irrespective of the caption on the paper which produces him in the
jurisdiction seeking him for trial.""' Finally, the court rejected the
government's contention that the United States adopted the Agree-
ment only as a sending state."'
Judge Mansfield's dissent stressed the significant functional
and legal differences between the writ and a detainer.' 9° The pri-
mary purpose of the Agreement, he noted, was to prevent loss of
privileges, ineligibility for rehabilitation and work programs, and
other detrimental effects of a detainer that usually lasted the dura-
tion of a prisoner's sentence."' The writ, according to Judge Mans-
field, "has never had any such prejudicial consequences for the
prisoner; it is executed at once and, upon return of the prisoner to
181. Id. at 592-93.
182. Id. at 594.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 592 & n.5.
185. The court based its holding on United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520
F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1975), which concerned a state writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. See
text accompanying notes 67-82 supra.
186. 544 F.2d at 594.
187. Id. at 592-93.
188. Id. at 593. The court appears oblivious to the fact that the uncertainties referred
to were likely to exist regardless of whether the defendants were in state or federal custody
and that in federal custody, they would probably not be able to participate in work or
treatment programs.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 595 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 596.
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the state institution, it does not remain outstanding against him as
would a detainer. Thus the writ is wholly unrelated to detainers or
their prejudicial consequences."""2 Article IV, he reasoned, was
meant to allow states to obtain custody of prisoners held by the
federal authorities or by another state by means that previously did
not exist."3 He noted that the sanction of dismissal was to assure
that the state, "after obtaining the detained prisoner merely upon
request, will not abuse that privilege by returning him untried, since
this would have the effect of reinstating and indefinitely prolonging
the detainer. . . with its detrimental effects.""' 4 The dissent argued
that eliminating the harmful effects of the detainer is the motivat-
ing force of the Agreement; because a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum does not entail any of the consequences of a detainer,
the Act is not invoked by its issuance.9 5 Judge Mansfield also noted
that the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Criminal Jus-
tice Reform Act of 1975 (S-1)" stated that Congress had not in-
tended to limit the scope and applicability of the writ in enacting
the federal version of the Agreement in 1970. While the majority
gave little weight to expressions of intent of a subsequent Congress,
the dissent noted that twelve of the fifteen members of the 1975
committee that issued the S-1 report also were members of the
committee that recommended adoption of the Agreement in 1970.17
In the next Second Circuit decision construing the Agreement
Judge Mansfield wrote for the majority. The defendant in United
States v. Ford"8 was in a Massachusetts prison when the United
States obtained a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to bring
him to federal district court in New York. When the government was
granted a continuance, the defendant upon his request was returned
to Massachusetts. After a 17 month delay, a second writ issued and
defendant returned to federal court for trial and moved for dismissal
192. Id. at 596-97.
193. Id. at 597.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. The Committee stated that the Agreement:
has been amended to clarify the intent of Congress by providing that the Federal Govern-
ment is a participant in the Agreement only in the capacity of sending state. Federal
prosecution authorities and all Federal defendants have always had and continue to have
recourse to a speedy trial in a Federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5), the
Federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. The Committee does not intend, nor
does it believe that the Congress in enacting the Agreement in 1970 intended, to limit
the scope and applicability of that writ.
S. REP. No. 94-00, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 983-84 (1975).
197. Judge Mansfield distinguished the Groomes case, as a state writ has no extraterri-
torial effect and could thus only function as a detainer.
198. 550 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1977).
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under articles IV(e) and V(a).'11 In contrast to the situation in
Mauro, the government in Ford conceded that a detainer had been
filed prior to issuance of the writ but argued that the writ did not
constitute a "request for temporary custody" under article IV.10®
Such a construction, argued the government, would repeal by impli-
cation the habeas corpus statute."0 ' Judge Mansfield, who had dis-
sented in Mauro, found no difficulty in applying the Agreement here
because a federal detainer had been lodged against the defendant
for years.1 2 Addressing the argument distinguishing a "request"
from a federal writ, the court refused to
take a hypothetical and possibly non-existent conflict between a minor provi-
sion of the Act which relates to transfer mechanics [permitting the governor
to disapprove a request] and prior federal law (28 U.S.C. § 2241) and to use
it as the touchstone for an interpretation of the rest of the Act that would
vitiate its operation insofar as it affects federal detainers, since virtually all
federal transfers are conducted pursuant to the writ. This, in turn, would
substantially impair the operation of the Agreement as a whole, since federal
detainers form a large percentage of all detainers outstanding.2 3
The court emphasized the need for uniformity and a comprehensive
and coherent solution to the problems of detainers.2 11 Although the
court held that the prisoner waived his right to dismissal under
article IV(e) by requesting the return to state prison,2 5 and that the
purpose of preventing interference with rehabilitation would not be
served by requiring continuous federal custody, it nonetheless or-
dered dismissal based on article V(c), violation of the 120 day
limit.20' The court found that although some of the requested contin-
uances were reasonable and necessary, thereby justifying extension
of the time limit, other delays were not properly granted,2"7 leaving
dismissal of the indictment the only possible remedy.
A third Second Circuit case reflects a desire to limit the appli-
cability of the Agreement. In United States v. Chico,20 ' the defen-
dants, serving state sentences in Connecticut, were indicted by a
federal grand jury in Connecticut, brought to federal district court
for arraignment, then immediately returned to state prison. Later
199. Id. at 735-36.
200. Id. at 736.
201. Id. at 737.
202. Id. at 741.
203. Id. at 742.
204. Id. at 741.
205. Compare the Mauro court's attitude, supra note 176.
206. 550 F.2d at 743.
207. The improper delay actually was caused by the trial judge, who, the court said,
should have reassigned the case to another judge if his own calendar was full.
208. 558 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1977).
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both pleaded guilty and were placed on probation upon their release
from state custody.2 1 On a subsequent charge of violation of that
probation, defendants argued that the government had violated ar-
ticle IV(e) by returning them to state prison after arraignment and
before trial.210 Rejecting their claim, Judge Mansfield found that
article IV(e) does not apply when a prisoner is removed from prison
for a few hours to appear in federal court without ever being held
at any place of imprisonment other than that of the sending state.
211
As in Ford, Mansfield again refused to hold that a writ is a detainer,
distinguishing Mauro and Ford on the ground that the defendants
in Chico were never imprisoned by the receiving state.212 Addition-
ally, he noted that neither their physical presence nor the rehabili-
tation program at the state institution had been interrupted .21 The
court found support for its holding in article V(e), which refers to
the prisoner's return "'to the original place of imprisonment'
[which] . ..necessarily implies removal to another place of im-
prisonment in the receiving state. ' 214 The court held that bringing
a prisoner to federal court for "short, discrete appearances," at least




(2) Opposition to Mauro
The First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have announced their oppo-
sition to the Second Circuit's interpretation of the federal role under
the Agreement. The first appellate decision to hold that a writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum is neither a detainer nor a request
under article IV was United States v. Scallion.216 Scallion, a New
York state prisoner, was sent to the federal district court in Louis-
iana pursuant to a federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequen-
dum.217 While awaiting trial in Louisiana, he returned to New York
209. Id. at 1048.
210. Id.




215. Id. The court did not reach the issue of the effect of a guilty plea on LAD rights.
See Strawderman v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1977) (voluntary guilty plea
waives rights). See also text accompanying notes 262-64 infra. In the most recent Second
Circuit decision concerning the Agreement, Edwards v. United States, 564 F.2d 652 (1977)
(per curiam), the court did not reach the substantive issues, which included the effect of a
guilty plea, the fact that the defendant was not "serving a term of imprisonment," and the
Chico issue. The panel chose to affirm denial of the claim on the ground that an ]AD claim
is not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). Id. at 653.
216. 548 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1977).
217. Id. at 1169-70. Defendant was actually in California at the time the writ was issued
for trial on federal charges. Government's Brief at 3.
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at his own request to attend a parole hearing and moved for dis-
missal under articles IV(e) and IV(c).215 The court held that the
Agreement does not govern transfers under the federal writ because
of the functional and legal differences between the detainer and the
writ. 19 Emphasizing the judicial character of the writ, the court
stated:
The writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued by a federal district court
is an order commanding the production of a prisoner promptly or by a specified
date . . . whereas a detainer is merely a notice that the prisoner is wanted to
face pending criminal charges and requires further process . . . before the
prisoner is turned over.2
The court found that preserving the writ as an alternative means of
transfer was reasonably compatible with the purpose of the Agree-
ment, which concerns the abuse of detainers rather than problems
with the judicial writ.22'
The Sixth Circuit articulated a similar rationale in Ridgeway
v. United States, 222 when a prisoner was taken from a Michigan state
prison to federal court in the same state several times pursuant to
a federal writ. The government had lodged no detainer against the
prisoner. 2n Holding that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum
could not be equated with a detainer, the court emphasized the
informal nature of the detainer as well as its profound effect on the
prisoner's institutional life, an effect not produced by the writ.2
Additionally, the court observed that the writ, which can be issued
only by a federal court, is executed immediately, unlike a detainer,
which is filed by police or prosecutor and can affect the prisoner's
institutional life for many years. 225 The court agreed with the gov-
ernment that Congress did not intend to repeal by implication the
habeas corpus statute, as such an interpretation violates fundamen-
tal rules of statutory construction. 221 Because both statutes serve
distinct purposes, the court preferred to reconcile them, especially
since the legislative history of the Agreement does not mention the
writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. 227 In United States v.
218. Id. at 1170.
219. Id. at 1173.
220. Id. at 1173.
221. The court said that the Agreement provides a method not the only method. Id. at
1171. See S. REP. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4864, 4865.
222. 558 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1977).
223. Id. at 358-59.
224. Id. at 362. See text accompanying notes 11-20 supra.
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Eaddy,25 the court remanded the case for determination whether a
detainer had been lodged, holding that transfer of the defendant
solely by writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum did not invoke
the Agreement.2  Thus the Sixth Circuit appears to agree with
Judge Mansfield's position in Ford and Mauro that the triggering
event is the lodging of a detainer, not the use of the writ.
In United States v. Kenaan,2 0 the First Circuit joined the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits, holding that in the absence of a detainer, a
federal writ does not invoke the Agreement. The court repeated the
theme of Scallion and Ridgeway that the writ has never been asso-
ciated with the problems common to detainers and with the diffi-
culty of transfer between states.2n Responding to the argument that
article IV will be rendered meaningless if the writ is not governed
by the Agreement, the court emphasized judicial control of the writ:
The writ and the actions taken pursuant thereto being under the control of the
issuing court, we are confident that the court will be alert to, and fully empow-
ered to forestall, potential abuse of the writ. Second, any concern over poten-
tial delay-in-trial abuses by the federal government are further diminished by
the provisions of the federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974.
2
2
The court also gave great credence to the implied repeal argu-
ment, 3 noting that the court's duty is to interpret seemingly incon-
sistent statutes in order to allow both to operate harmoniously.24
(3) The Third Circuit's Approach
The Third Circuit has given Mauro its broadest application,
rejecting both the views of the First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits that
a federal writ is not a detainer and the Second Circuit's limitation
in Chico. In United States v. Sorrell, 35 a federal writ of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum brought the defendant from a Pennsyl-
vania prison to federal district court in Philadelphia for arraignment
on federal charges. He was returned to prison prior to trialus and
moved to dismiss the federal charges under article IV(e). The Third
Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the indictment, hold-
ing that the writ was both a detainer and a request for temporary
228. 563 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1977).
229. Id. at 255-56.
230. 557 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1977).
231. Id. at 916.
232. Id. at 917 (citations omitted).
233. See text accompanying note 227 supra.
234. 557 F.2d at 917.
235. 562 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1977).
236. Id. at 228-29. A second writ issued and defendant requested a continuance. When
the third writ brought him to court, defendant moved to dismiss. Id. at 229.
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custody under the Agreement.131 Relying on the Groomes interpreta-
tion that the Agreement was intended to prevent interference with
rehabilitation,25 the court rejected the government's attempts to
distinguish the writ from proceedings under the Agreement2' and its
attempt to distinguish Groomes on its facts. The government had
argued that while the prisoner in Groomes had been transferred nine
times between two states and had waited nine months for trial, the
defendant in Sorrell was not "shuttled back and forth between dif-
ferent states .... ,,210 The court, however, refused to distinguish
between the case in which a prisoner is brought to federal court for
arraignment and immediately returned to his home prison a short
distance away2 1 and the situation in Groomes, in which the defen-
dant's original place of imprisonment is in another state. The court
thus concluded that article IV(e) applies without exception when-
ever a detainer has been lodged. 22 In reaching this conclusion, the
court injected a new policy consideration into the article IV(e) prob-
lem, noting that returning defendant to the state prison impeded his
ability to consult with counsel, a result "inconsistent with the reme-
dial purposes and plain statutory language of the Detainer Agree-
ment."1
24 3
The access-to-counsel rationale was repeated in United States
v. Thompson.4 In Thompson, the defendant was serving a state
sentence in a Philadelphia state prison designated as a federal de-
tention facility.24 5 Thus, had the federal authorities retained custody
of the defendant, in technical compliance with the Agreement, the
defendant could have remained in the same institution. The court
dismissed the indictment for failure to make this paper change of
custody, on the ground that because the prisoner "was not as avail-
able to his counsel. . . as he would have been if the federal authori-
ties had retained custody of him during this period, we cannot say
that the failure to comply . . . is so insubstantial that . . . article
237. Id. at 231.
238. See text accompanying notes 67-81 supra.
239. The Government argued, inter alia, that procedures under the Agreement are to
be invoked by the executive branch; the district court here issued the writs on its own motion
without resort to the Agreement. Government's Brief at 4.
240. Id. at 2.
241. Gratorford Prison, where defendant was imprisoned, is approximately 35 miles
from Philadelphia. 562 F.2d at 229 n.3.
242. An ironic aspect of Sorrell is that if the defendant had remained in federal custody
from the time of arraignment until trial, he would have been kept in a state prison, as there
was no federal facility in eastern Pennsylvania. Id.
243. Id. at 232.
244. 562 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1977).
245. Id. at 233-34.
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IV(e). . . should not be applied according to its terms."'24 Straining
to find some benefit that would accrue to the prisoner by remaining,
at least on paper, in federal custody, the court noted that if Thomp-
son had remained in federal hands, the United States Marshal could
have brought him "to a place of easy accessibility to his lawyer.
'" 2 47
The court did not consider that Thompson conceivably might have
been sent to one of six state prisons248 designated for federal
use-some much farther away from the federal court-and thus
might have been much less accessible to counsel. One question that
arises from the court's analysis is why the court tried so hard to find
some prejudice to the prisoner due to his return to state custody if
the Agreement is to apply without exception. The court's endeavor
to find actual prejudice in this case suggests that the government
should argue that minor technical violations of the Agreement con-
stitute harmless error not requiring dismissal.
Two judges filed dissenting opinions from the en banc majority
opinions in Sorrell and Thompson. Judge Weis stressed the prob-
lems of applying language designed for states to the federal govern-
ment. For example, the provision that trial shall begin within 120
days of the prisoner's arrival in the receiving state is clear when
applied to transfers from one state to another. Confusion arises,
however, when the prisoner is transferred from a state prison to a
federal court in the same state, since the prisoner has been in the
United States, the receiving state, continuously.49 If the Agreement
is to apply to such a transfer, the court must interpret "receiving
state" to mean custody of the United States. If read literally, how-
ever, the statute could not be enforced against the United States.20
Judge Weis persuasively argued that "[tjo read the ambiguous and
superficially considered Agreement as constricting the power which
has been exercised by the federal courts for almost two hundred
years is a questionable solution to a perplexing problem." 5 ' Retain-
246. Id. at 234.
247. Id.
248. See United States v. Sorrell, 562 F.2d 227, 229 n.3 (3d Cir. 1977).
249. 562 F.2d at 232, 235.
250. Id. Examples abound of terms that cannot be applied to the United States as a
"state." Judge Weis noted that article V(h) provides that "responsibility for the prisoner rests
with the receiving state from the time 'a party State receives custody. .. until such prisoner
is returned to the territory and custody of the sending State. .. ' Where the prisoner is
transferred from a federal institution to a state, he has never left the United States." Id.
Similarly, if arrival in the receiving state is interpreted as custody of the federal government,
then ambiguity arises in article V(g): "For all purposes other than that for which temporary
custody as provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain
in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending State .
251. 562 F.2d at 236.
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ing the writ as an alternate method of transfer "would not defeat
the primary aims of the Agreement-to permit the prisoner and
authorities to obtain speedy disposition of outstanding detainers
and prevent unnecessary interruptions to rehabilitative pro-
grams. ' '2 2 Applying the Agreement in Sorrell would actually result
in a longer disruption of the state rehabilitative program since the
prisoner would have to remain in a facility that does not offer work
or rehabilitation programs.
25 3
Judge Garth dissented also, joining in Judge Weis' conclusion
that "in adopting the Interstate Agreement Congress has attempted
to fit a square peg into a round hole,"' 4 and arguing that the legisla-
tion could never have been passed without opposition had such a
result been intended.2 15 The only permanent solution is legislative
amendment, but until then Judge Garth suggested applying article
IV(e) only when state lines are crossed during the transfer. 2 6 His
solution thus would subject the federal writ to the Agreement only
when the state prisoner is sent to a federal court outside the sending
state.
V. COMMENT AND PROPOSAL
The serious problems associated with the federal role as a
"state" under the Agreement are rooted in the drafters' failure to
explore fully the consequences of providing for federal participation
in the Agreement as a means of resolving state problems. Congress
had the opportunity to study the probable effect of the Act on fed-
eral procedures, but appears to have been oblivious to the possible
impact of article IV on federal indictments. One explanation, fre-
quently advanced by the federal government and consistently re-
jected by the courts,257 is that Congress intended to adopt the Agree-
ment with the United States acting only as a "sending state." No
evidence in the legislative history supports this view, although a
later Senate committee composed primarily of members of the origi-
nal committee recommending adoption of the Agreement indicated
that such was the original intent.258 In reality, the federal role simply
252. Id.
253. Id. at 237.
254. Id. at 236.
255. Id. at 239.
256. Id. at 245. Thus article IV(e) would apply to federal-state transfers only when they
have the same characteristics as comparable state-state transfers: (1) state boundaries are
crossed; (2) a prisoner confined for violating the laws of one jurisdiction; (3) the prisoner is
returned to an institution of the same jurisdiction as the one from which he was taken.
257. Even courts that have found for the government on other grounds have rejected
the sending-state argument. See United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1977).
258. See text accompanying notes 196-97 supra. S-1, which was never passed, would
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was not studied thoroughly, and thus little evidence of the true
congressional intent can be gleaned from the legislative history.
Forced to fit a square peg into a round hole, the courts have
proposed several interpretations of the Agreement pending legisla-
tive amendment.29 One approach, adopted by the Third Circuit, is
to make the Agreement the exclusive means of transfer for the pur-
pose of prosecution. 20 This method has the advantages of certainty
and predictability once the prosecuting authority knows that it
must proceed under the Agreement. Problems arise, however, if this
interpretation is applied retroactively to transfers occurring before
the government was aware of the Agreement's broad application.
The scope of the problem depends upon whether a prisoner must
raise an IAD claim at trial, or whether he may raise the issue for
the first time on appeal or through collateral attack.26' The Sixth
Circuit has held that a prisoner may raise the claim on appeal if the
government does not demonstrate that he has "slept on his rights"
below.262 The Third Circuit, replying to the argument that its broad
interpretation of the Agreement would result in the vacation of
hundreds of otherwise valid convictions, 2 has stated that the claim
must be advanced at the trial level or it is deemed waived.
264
Even if the Agreement is not applied retroactively, disadvan-
tages exist that outweigh the benefits of a broad application. First,
requiring the prisoner to remain in federal custody from arraign-
ment through trial may be of little benefit and may actually hinder
the state rehabilitation program. Many prisoners probably would
prefer to be returned to the work, treatment, and training opportun-
ities of the state institution rather than remain in a federal deten-
tion center. Additionally, if the state prison is used for federal de-
tention, the Agreement penalizes too harshly the failure to transfer
paper custody of the prisoner. The Justice Department has indi-
cated that total compliance will be expensive and will contribute to
the overcrowding of federal facilities."5 Considering the dubious
have limited the federal role to that of a sending state only, thus preventing state prisoners
from disposing of federal detainers under article H. The Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1976
has modified this amendment, treating the United States as both a receiving and sending
state under article I and as a sending state only for article IV.
259. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 562 F.2d 232, 244 (3d Cir. 1977) (Garth, J.,
dissenting).
260. The courts have consistently rejected claims attempting to regulate the writ of
habeas corpus ad testificandum by the Agreement. See Adams v. United States, 423 F. Supp.
578 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); United States v. Evans, 423 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
261. See, e.g., United States v. Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1977).
262. United States v. Eaddy, 563 F.2d 252, 255 (6th Cir. 1977).
263. United States v. Sorrell, 562 F.2d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 1977).
264. Id.
265. Memorandum, supra note 147, at 39.
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benefit of article IV(e) for most prisoners, a more practical and
realistic solution would be to charge the government with violation
of its article IV(e) duty only if the prisoner has requested and been
denied the right to remain in federal custody, or if actual prejudice
results from the return to state prison prior to trial.
A further disadvantage of applying IAD broadly is that, carried
to its logical extreme, article IV could be construed to require trial
on all federal indictments prior to the prisoner's return to the origi-
nal place of imprisonment.26 For example, if a state prisoner wanted
on federal bank robbery charges in several states is taken for ar-
raignment to one of the federal districts and then returned to state
prison, he conceivably could attack all pending federal indictments,
since he was not tried on them prior to his return to the original
place of imprisonment and the United States is treated as one state
under the Agreement. 2 7 Although the Agreement was not intended
to aid a prisoner in obtaining dismissals of charges, an overly strict
and literal interpretation will have this effect.
28
The more moderate approach of the Second Circuit, illustrated
by the Chico case,2 9 refuses to apply the Agreement when the defen-
dant has been brought to federal court only for "short, discrete
appearances" and has not been imprisoned away from the original
place of imprisonment. 20 This interpretation of the Agreement pre-
vents abuse of the writ, since the prisoner cannot be freely shuttled
back and forth between jurisdictions and the state rehabilitation
program is not interrupted. On the other hand, the government is
not forced into technical compliance with the Agreement that does
not benefit the prisoner. The approach is deficient in several re-
spects, however, sacrificing predictability and certainty, generating
litigation, and forcing individual evaluation of each case. What if
the defendant remains overnight in federal custody before his return
to state prison? Must the state institution and the federal court be
in the same city, or the same state? Judge Weis' dissent in Sorrell
and Thompson 27' modified the Chico approach by applying the
Agreement to federal transfers only when state lines are crossed.
This interpretation permits predictability, but has no basis in the
Agreement itself and does not deal with the fundamental differences
266. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
267. LAD, art. II.
268. See Brant v. United States, No. 77-160 (W.D. Pa. March 24, 1977) (the prisoner
made this argument, but his claim was never decided as he was killed while attempting to
escape from the federal penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia).
269. 558 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1977). See text accompanying notes 206-13 supra.
270. 558 F.2d at 1048.
271. See text accompanying notes 249-57 supra.
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between the federal writ and the detainer. 2
The foregoing approaches fail to accommodate reasonably the
conflicting needs of the prisoner, whose rehabilitation must not
needlessly be interrupted, the prosecutor, who needs to know what
procedures to follow, and the court, which must not be inundated
with litigation. The optimum interpretation of the Agreement
would conform to present congressional intent, retaining intact the
writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum yet permitting the prisoner
to challenge abuse of the writ and interference with his rehabilita-
tion. Since Congress in the Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1976 has
expressed an intent to exclude the United States from the Agree-
ment as a receiving state under article IV,2 3 the best solution is to
effectuate that intent by applying article IV only to transfers "made
possible" by that article, as the Agreement itself provides. 214 Writs
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum have their own statutory basis
275
and according to the better view must be obeyed by prison officials
under the supremacy clause; 218 therefore, they should not be treated
as proceedings made possible by article IV, irrespective of whether
a detainer has been lodged. If a detainer has been lodged, a prisoner
would still have the right under article III to request disposition of
the underlying charges.2 7 If the prisoner initiates the request, the
180 day limit of article III applies regardless of the method used to
obtain the prisoner, because the prisoner clearly has invoked the
Agreement and is entitled to its protection.2 8 On the other hand, if
the United States, on its own motion, seeks to try a prisoner and
uses the federal writ, it should not be subject to requirements de-
signed to regulate requests for custody made possible by the Agree-
ment. When a detainer has been lodged, however, and the govern-
ment abuses the writ by constantly transferring the prisoner, delay-
ing trial, thereby prolonging the detainer, the prisoner should be
able to invoke the Agreement's protection by requesting trial under
article III. Once the prisoner requests trial, the time limits of article
III apply. This view restores the Agreement's original focus on the
detainer, avoids needless requirements that do not benefit the pris-
oner, and retains the sanctions of the Agreement if the prisoner's
272. See text accompanying notes 190-94 supra.
273. S. 1437, H.R. 6869, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
274. IAD, art. IV.
275. See text accompanying note 155 supra.
276. See text accompanying notes 166-68 supra.
277. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
278. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
279. See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.
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request is ignored. 20 Although the Agreement should not be con-
strued narrowly to dilute its protection for the prisoner, neither
should it be applied broadly to interfere with prosecutions when
little potential for abuse exists and when neither the drafters nor
Congress contemplated its application.
28 1
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280. It is also in harmony with the federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-
3174 (1976), which deals with federal transfers of prisoners for trial without reference to the
IAD provisions.
281. See note 273 supra and accompanying text.
